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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
The paper presents an exploratory case study carried out to address the research question ‘how does complexity 
in the organization affect the ability of Systems Engineers to meet delivery expectations in terms of cost and time?’ 
The review considers how literature in the Systems Engineering arena describes and addresses the problem of failing 
to meet delivery expectations. An absence of empirical research that considers a Systems Engineering organization 
as a complex adaptive system is identified. 
 
The industrial context that led to this research is described, which, along with consideration of the literature 
review, supports the choice of methodology. Evidence is provided and analyzed from two perspectives; first a 
traditional reductionist view of business and project management within an organization, which is based on a 
deterministic relationship between cause and effect, and second a complex adaptive system view of the organization 
where cause and effect can be understood in hindsight, but not precisely predicted (Kurtz and Snowden, 2003).  
Within this perspective it is accepted that emergence is possible. This case study finds that delivery expectations are 
founded upon predictions of outcomes derived from deterministic causal relations. These expectations are not 
always met by the emergent outcomes that arise from the complex organization.  
 
2. LITERATURE  
 
2.1 Systems Engineering 
 
Literature from the Systems Engineering domain was systematically reviewed.  Key writings and authors on this 
topic were identified by searching within journals and proceedings from conferences that target Systems Engineers. 
Academic materials written by the key authors were also reviewed, as were sources that were frequently referenced. 
The material in the round recognizes that development projects may fail to meet delivery expectations, and that 
attempts to address the issue from within Systems Engineering are predominately positivist, relying only on 
quantitative methods (Gilbert, et. al, 2014). Muller et al (2013) describes organizational project management 
research as a field also dominated by reductionist paradigms and perspectives.  
 
The dominance of reductionist-by-default research methods within Systems Engineering research is described by 
Brown (2009), who notes that Systems Engineering researchers are now moving beyond the realms of physical 
sciences, but wonders whether they are equipped to do so. Brown (2009) found in a review of selected Systems 
Engineering literature that methodology wasn’t always discussed, and when it was it was often describing methods 
used, rather than the logic underpinning the selection of the methods (i.e. methodology). This lead to a view that 
research across the industry draws ‘superficially (if at all) from any recognizable theoretical position’ (Brown, 
2009).   
 
Valerdi and Davidz (2007) note that ‘while many Systems Engineers have formal training in classical 
engineering disciplines, the problems faced in the field are both technical and social in nature’. A background in 
classical engineering, or physical sciences supports capability in positivist, reductionist approaches which are 
underpinned by a deterministic view of cause and effect. As problems faced by Systems Engineers span technical 
and social domains, the suitability of applying training from classical engineering within this new broader realm 
must be considered. They go on to describe challenges of empirical research in Systems Engineering, citing the 
relative immaturity of the field, the lack of appreciation for empirical research, the lack of access to data, and a lack 
of accepted metrics.  They also note that practitioners training ‘often emphasizes a positivist, quantitative approach 
to research inquiry’ in calling for case study research as ‘a constructive way to deal with the non-reductionist form 
of SE required for dealing with complex systems’. Valerdi et al (2010) push the Systems Engineering research 
community to consider hybrid approaches within a philosophically consistent framework. This literature provides 
some level of explanation of why approaches taken by the Systems Engineering community to understand the issue 
of failure to meet delivery expectations are primarily reductionist and deterministic in nature.   
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The ongoing research effort within Thales UK explores the influence that complexity may have on the ability to 
meet delivery expectations with the aim to reduce or eliminate ‘problematic projects’, which are projects where 
expected costs are exceeded by more than £10million, and the cost overrun is not anticipated by high level 
management.  The particular aspect of complexity under consideration is where the relationship between cause and 
effect can only be seen in retrospect (Kurtz and Snowden, 2003; Snowden and Boone, 2007). The term ‘complexity’ 
has no singularly agreed definition (which is not an issue unique to Systems Engineering), and while Systems 
Engineers may refer to complexity frequently, the precision with which the term is used in literature and 
communication varies. This issue was encountered by Sheard (2012) in a retrospective survey to study the impact of 
complexity variable values on Systems Engineering projects. In an earlier paper, which supported this later work 
Sheard (2009) provides a definition of a complex system (which does not conflict with some of the many definitions 
of a complex adaptive system), and considers the INCOSE organization as an example.  This theoretical view of a 
particular organization that Systems Engineering practitioners may be familiar with as a complex adaptive system is 
the singular example that could be found in Systems Engineering literature that considers an organization as a 
complex system.  
 
 
2.2 Organizations as Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS) 
 
A CAS evidence scan (The Evidence Centre, 2010) finds that CAS work in the engineering sector is mostly 
descriptive or theoretical, rather than empirical or applied. It also identifies CAS thinking and approaches in use in 
management, urban planning, economics, environmental science, education, and healthcare.  Gell-Mann (1994) 
states the term CAS has different meanings to different people, this view is also supported by the findings of the 
CAS evidence scan, which notes the most common definition of a complex adaptive system is based on the work of 
Holland (The Evidence Centre, 2010). The research presented in this paper thus uses Holland’s (2014) definition of 
CAS applied to an organization where the staff are the agents of a complex adaptive system.  In particular Holland’s 
description of the activities of agents at a granular level of detail is applied (Holland, 2014 pp26-32). It states that all 
CAS agents (which learn or adapt in response to interactions with other agents) have three levels of activity; 1) 
performance of moment-to-moment capabilities which designate an agents behavioral repertoire at a point in time, 
2) credit-assignment whereby the usefulness of available capabilities can be rated higher (than others) as experience 
finds that those capabilities lead to rewards, and 3) rule-discovery whereby the agent generates new capabilities. 
Holland also notes that the study of CAS is still in its early stages, so only pieces of a theory exist (ibid).  
 
Palmberg (2009a) puts forward a tentative model for managing organizations as CAS in work that contributes to 
her doctoral thesis (Palmberg, 2009b), which also includes a case study methodology for exploratory and 
interpretive empirical research in this field, which considers the work of  (Yin, 2014). Friedman and Sage (2004) 
discuss the role of case study research in Systems Engineering and provide an example case study framework for 
Systems Engineering and systems management, also derived from (Yin, 2014). 
 
The systems science community which joins the Systems Engineering community through the ISSS and links 
with INCOSE have published empirical research that views a project team as a complex adaptive system to explore 
the relationship between group development and complex adaptive cycles (Edson, 2012). The research is a 
retrospective revelatory case study, using Holland’s definition of CAS. Palmberg (2009b) articulates a research 
methodology for exploratory empirical research of organizations as CAS, but no empirical research of a Thales-like 
organization that develops complex products could be found in this review.  
 
2.3 Ontological and Epistemological views of Organizational Change 
 
Van de Ven and Poole (2005, p1381) present a typology of four approaches for studying organizational change.  
They are defined by one of two ontological views (whether organizations consist of things, or processes) and by one 
of two epistemologies, one that ‘seeks explanation of deterministic causation’ (referred to as variance methods), and 
one which provides ‘explanations that tell a narrative or story about how a sequence of events unfolds to produce a 
given outcome’ (referred to as process methods). Van de Ven and Poole note that the four approaches may be 
viewed as opposing or competing views, though the authors see them as complimentary, arguing that pluralist 
insights provide a richer understanding.  
Within Systems Engineering literature, Valerdi et al (2010) call for hybrid approaches in Systems Engineering 
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research, and Midgley (2011) makes a case for theoretical pluralism partnered with methodological pluralism. The 
Van de Ven and Poole (2005) typology provides an evaluative framework for considering different perspectives on 
organizational change.  
 
2.4 Contribution of this Paper 
 
The Systems Engineering literature reviewed highlights a gap, but also an appetite for theoretically rigorous 
empirical research that considers an organization as a CAS, and investigates how this might shed light on the issue 
of project delivery performance across a Systems Engineering development organization.  
 
This paper brings together these arguments and gaps to present a single revelatory empirical case study with 
multiple units of analysis considered from two perspectives i) the ‘traditional’ Systems Engineering perspective, 
which considers an organization to be comprised of things and considers change to be driven deterministically and 
ii) a ‘Complex Adaptive Systems’ view which captures process narratives and identifies and expects emergence.      
3. INDUSTRIAL CONTEXT 
 
Thales UK is comprised of five operating domains, each of which is comprised of a number of business lines. 
Each business line carries a portfolio of projects that are, at any one point in time, in varying states of completion. 
The first author is a systems researcher, embedded within Thales UK and affiliated with the corporate Systems 
Engineering function, rather than with any one domain, business line, or project. The systems researcher was placed 
within the case study business line at the request of the business line to help them understand more clearly whether 
their work was likely to meet solution delivery expectations in terms of timeframe and cost. An embedded research 
position provides a rare opportunity to carry out and publish empirical research of a Systems Engineering 
development organization, and so provides the context to carry out a revelatory case study.  Systems engineering 
practitioners rarely have the combination of research skills, non-disclosure agreements, and available time to 
perform and publish this kind of research.  Conversely, academic researchers rarely have the access, and ability to 
appear as ‘an insider’ that is needed to carry out and publish empirical research from within a Systems Engineering 
organization.  
 
3.1 Organization of the Case Study Business Line  
 
Nominally, Thales UK is a matrix organization (Hobday, 2000), with a dominating project structure and weaker 
functional structure as shown in Figure 1. The Project Manager (a member of the Program Management Function) 
reports to the Business Line Management through the dominant project reporting line, and to the Program 
Management Head of Function through the weaker functional reporting line. Similarly, Systems Engineers report to 
the Project Manager through the project reporting line and the Systems Engineering Head of Function through the 
functional reporting line.  As systems under development are decomposed to sub-systems, which include software, 
software engineers report to Systems Engineers in the project line. Software engineers report to the Software 
Engineering Head of Function through the functional reporting line. Thales Group has an enterprise architecture, 
which describes tailorable processes, methods, and tools that should, or may be, used within business lines and other 
corporate entities. This architecture ensures coherence between projects, function, and management roles within 
Business Lines and the wider organization.   
 
In the case study business line, and within the boundaries applied to the case study dataset, individual projects 
are related to one of three products, each of which include major software sub-systems.  Staff state that software is 
developed using an agile scrum methodology, Systems Engineers describe their lifecycle as vee, or agile front-end 
and vee back-end.   
 
“Software is running agile, systems is still traditional” (Key Stakeholder, Head of Systems Engineering) 
“Software is agile, systems is v” (Head of Software Engineering) 
“It’s agile for the first 2/3rd of the v, then systems IVVQ for the last part” (Scrum Master – Product 2) 
 
The nature of the organization provided an opportunity to explore how complexity affects the ability of Systems 
Engineers to meet delivery expectations by examining a number of units of analysis concurrently. 
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4. METHODOLOGY 
 
The research stance is critical realist (Sayer, 2000; Mingers 2004; Bhaskar 2008).  The empirical and socio-
technical nature of the case study means evidence gathered from within the organization may be first order data (e.g. 
a number in a spreadsheet, a statement made in conversation) or second order data (e.g. evidence of how first order 
data is interpreted and used by staff in the case study organization).  This requires a capture of multiple 
perspectives, which can be appreciated by the stratified ontology of critical realism. Some staffs believe that nothing 
exists beyond the empirical world, and enact management approaches that align with this view.  Others believe that 
aspects of the world exist beyond our ability to know and experience them, and similarly, enact management 
approaches that align with this view. Critical realism is also concerned with causation, and provides a framework 
through which both deterministic causality – where a specific cause leads to a specific effect with regularity –  and 
emergence – where cause and effect can be linked in hindsight but can not predicted with certainty – can be 
understood. Causality is of interest because it is a mechanism that could be leveraged by management to realize 
improved performance. 
 
4.1 Analytical Framework 
 
Our analytical framework considers two perspectives.  
 
The first is a ‘traditional’ epistemological and ontological perspective, which is prevalent in project management 
and Systems Engineering research.  Implicit in the emphasis on ‘positivist, quantitative approaches to research 
inquiry’ identified by Martin and Davidz (2007) is a preference for an ontological view of an organization that 
consists of things and an epistemology based on deterministic causation. This perspective leads to a focus on 
planning and plans that describe quite specifically how the future will evolve, with the expectation that our view of 
the future will materialize as planned; i.e. we have a belief that patterns of cause and effect can be manipulated 
through managed control. Van de Ven and Poole (2005) describe this perspective as ‘approach 1’. This view also 
encapsulates the interpretations of complexity that consider that the future can be precisely predicted, and therefore 
managed and controlled, if we build the correct model from which to perform the predictive analysis. This view 
aligns with the right hand side of the Cynefin Framework (Kurtz and Snowden, 2003; Snowden and Boone, 2007). 
 
The second perspective considered within the analytical framework views the organization as a ‘Complex 
Adaptive System’ comprised of Agents, which in this case are considered to be the staff in the organization. This 
perspective is described by Van de Ven and Poole as ‘approach 2’ and ‘approach 3’, which understand change 
through a process narrative.  The process narrative is captured as part of the data collection stage; it reports the 
beliefs, understanding, and motivations of the staff that, through agency, act within the organization. In this view, 
outcomes are emergent, rather than realized through planning, prediction, and control. Staff are agents within the 
system exhibiting free will; they are neither precisely predictable, nor is the range of actions they may take 
knowable in advance, at individual or group levels. This view aligns with the left hand side of the Cynefin 
Framework (Kurtz and Snowden, 2003; Snowden and Boone, 2003).  
 
4.2 Method 
 
A participant-observation approach was used in field-work, where data was collected for consideration in real-
time, and for in-depth analysis at a later stage.  Data collection progressed in consideration of ethical dilemmas and 
tensions between seeking rigor and establishing and maintaining trust within the staff group. Stakeholder 
engagement was primarily 1:1 as a mechanism to develop greater trust and elicit more honest and open views from 
interviewees.  All staff engaged with were made aware that the systems researcher was carrying out research, and 
that appropriate security clearances and Non-Disclosure Agreements were in place to protect sensitive data and 
systems, yet still provide access and allow publication. Semi-structured interviews were conducted in a variety of 
ways ranging from formal meetings to informal chats. They used the vernacular of the business line and mirrored the 
tone of the interviewee. They varied from being specifically planned, and scheduled by email and held in meeting 
rooms, to being more opportunistic in nature, for example by triggering a conversation in the kitchen while making a 
cup of coffee, or by a staff member dropping by the system researcher’s desk for an unprompted chat. Questions 
were open-ended, asking why, how, when, etc. in order to capture an expression of the interviewees beliefs, working 
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methods, and approaches, and their understanding of causal relationships, and also to obtain sources of verification 
or triangulation data to compare to evidence already captured from that interviewee, or from other sources in the 
business line. Archival and quantitative data was accessed via standard industry tools for finance, schedule, and 
resource profiling (Primavera®), task and problem tracking (Jira®) and System requirements management 
(Doors®). Other soft copy data was accessed via the business line network drives (as a non-project worker, the 
system researcher’s network access was restricted to management and project meta-data), and the corporate intranet.  
 
4.3 The Scope, Processing, and Consolidation of Data 
 
Data was collected from the case study business line over a 6-month period and amalgamated in to a case study 
database.  The case study database includes soft-copy reports, archival records, a transcript of one audio-recorded 
semi-structured interview, and ethnographic notebook entries which captured the system researcher’s actions, short-
term reflections, and plans as well as recording direct observations, and notes from meetings, discussions, and 
telephone calls. Soft copies of email correspondence were also captured.  
 
Boundaries were applied to the dataset to progress the work toward a discrete piece of research that could be 
reported concisely, yet still be substantive. The boundaries selected were: 
• The case study business line.  The case study business line interacts minimally with its domain and other 
Thales UK business units. 
• Projects relating to the three main products.  The bulk of the engineering headcount in the business unit is 
committed to developing and supporting three main, predominately software-based systems. 
• The key stakeholder and individuals I was subsequently referred on to either voluntarily, or through my own 
exploration of key relationships.   
 
Applying these boundaries added a level of manageability to the case study database, yet still provided ample 
data to consider the research question that seeks to understand how complexity in the organization affects the ability 
of Systems Engineers to meet delivery expectations.  
 
The application of these boundaries reduced the dataset from notes of 72 meetings to notes from 43 meetings 
with 12 staff, which were typed up from handwritten notes, resulting in a 44-page 21,000 word report which 
references 63 staff members, 7 business processes, 6 work sites, 4 commercial organizations, 4 customers, and 4 
Thales entities, all of which have been anonymized. Note, the original case study database still exists and is 
available to allow broader and deeper analysis in support of the ongoing research program. Extensive raw data is not 
presented in this paper to retain confidentiality, though representative samples are provided. 
5. EVIDENCE AND ANALYSIS 
Evidence relating to three topics was extracted from the case study database, and viewed through the two 
perspectives considered by this research. The themes are agile scrum sprints, staff circulation, and management 
databases. The units of analysis are the business line, the topic, and the individual stakeholders themselves (Yin, 
2014, p54).  Structuring the evidence and analysis in this way allows us to reveal how evidence within the units of 
analysis help address the research question.  
 
The ‘traditional’ perspective applied across the three topics would allow the aims and objectives of using agile 
sprints, a staff circulation policy, and a collection of management databases to be identified, and would allow 
deterministic causal evidence to be identified that shows the aims and objectives are satisfied by the structures that 
are in place. This ‘traditional’ view assumes all individuals have a common understanding of the aims and 
objectives of the business line, and they act uniformly and consistently to pursue these aims, since it is based upon 
the premise of deterministic cause and effect. 
 
The ‘Complex Adaptive System’ view provides a narrative that describes the evolution of events during the 6-
month investigation. As such, the data themselves reflect occurrences in the organization within the specific time 
period of data collection.  The organization, as represented by the narrative data, existed at the time but has 
subsequently continued to evolve and is now a different organization when considered at a detailed level. In this 
way, the data themselves become obsolete, though the nature of the dynamics observed within this case study may 
Page 6 of 22 
 
persevere, and indeed may be familiar and recognizable to practitioners working in other Systems Engineering 
organizations.    
  
5.1 Topic 1 - Agile Scrum Sprints  
 
The Systems Engineering development approach includes an architectural decomposition of the solution in to its 
component sub-systems.  The three products under consideration in this Business Line each include major software 
sub-systems.  The prevalence of a reductionist paradigm within the organization leads practitioners to conclude that, 
if the software sub-system team fails to meet delivery expectations (where the software team deliver a key 
subsystem to the Systems Engineering team, who then integrate sub-systems to make the whole), then the Systems 
Engineering team, as a knock-on effect, may subsequently fail to meet delivery expectations. This relationship 
illustrates how the ability to meet delivery expectations for software development is related to the ability of Systems 
Engineers to meet solution-level delivery expectations. The review of project development progress across the 
portfolio of all active projects across the business line is described in section 5.1.3.  
 
The software sub-systems developed in the Business Line are developed using agile approaches, specifically 
Scrum. ‘Scrum is a process framework that has been used to manage complex product development since the early 
1990’s. Scrum is not a process or a technique for building products; rather it is a framework within which you can 
employ various processes and techniques’ (Schwaber & Sutherland, 2013). A Scrum Team develops products 
iteratively and incrementally.  The Scrum Master helps those outside the Scrum Team understand how they can 
most productively work with the Scrum Team. ‘The heart of Scrum is a Sprint, a time-box of one month or less 
during which a “Done”, useable, and potentially releasable product Increment is created. Sprints best have consistent 
durations throughout a development effort.’ (Schwaber & Sutherland, 2013). Scrum theory, practices and rules 
require consecutive sprints to comprise the same Scrum team members, each of whom would be fully committed to 
the sprint, and not carrying out responsibilities elsewhere in the organisation. Each sprint is planned up-front, with 
work to-be-completed represented in the sprint backlog.  The sprint backlog remains stable throughout the duration 
of the sprint.  These consistencies would lead to improved sprint ‘velocity’ (a term relating to productivity) over 
time. Sprint velocity is expected to improve as the group, working together, becomes more effective and therefore 
more efficient over time.  The velocity, and amount of work that was planned and actually delivered during each 
sprint, can be viewed in a standard 7-sprint view in Jira. The rate of increase in velocity can be monitored to inform 
planning in upcoming sprints. 
 
5.1.1 The Traditional Perspective 
Jira is used to track tasks and problems in the software products under development, and as administrative 
support for agile sprints. Through a deterministic causality perspective, a sprint would be planned, its execution 
would follow the plan and the committed work would match the completed work, unless errors were made.    
 
The committed (planned) work and completed (actual) work were compared for seven consecutive sprints for 
each of the three products by examining the standard Velocity Charts from Jira.  Each product is developed by 
multiple sprint teams, each with their own sprint backlog to work through during each sprint. The amount of planned 
and actual work contained in each sprint backlog is expressed in quantitative units, allowing statistical analysis of 
the results.   
 
Plotting planned against actuals should yield a scatter plot with line of best fit described by mà1.0, and r2à1.0 
for large sample sizes. 
 
A total of 91 sprint results were gathered across the three products (product 1 provided 42 data points, product 2 
provided 21 data points, product 3 provided 28 data points). The r-squared of all 91 points was 0.92, and its line of 
best fit is described by y=0.68x (forcing a 0,0 intercept). See Tables 1 to 4. 
 
This analysis of the traditional perspective confirms the sprint is not performing as planned, or as expected by 
this perspective.  This view is unable to confirm why performance is not as expected. 
 
5.1.2 The Complex Adaptive System Perspective 
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The study database is examined to consider evidence of beliefs and perspectives of how Jira and the agile scrum 
are used, and how this helps meet delivery expectations. 
 
“The project has 3 pulls..the PM line…through operations about cost…and to the design criteria” (Systems 
Engineer – Product 3) 
 
“What we struggle to do is estimate and stick to it. Across a number of projects it’s pretty much the same 
year after year in the software domain…One cause of problems is other activities like business winning that’s 
over and above, but knowing that, we said we’d do the planned work” (Program Manager – Product 2) 
 
“The program manager asks why we aren’t loading [staff] to 100%...when reporting time in timesheets 
people put flat time across each day, we encourage Jira time reporting to be accurate…The project team 
changes, 1700 hours max at 18 engineers, 300 hours low, 400 hours is 6 engineers. I draw a line around staff 
time. The program manager asks ‘why does it take so long?’ I’m trying to do an estimating process that tells 
the story that the PMs will want. (Scrum Master – Product 1) 
 
“The main risk is in software development.….The business objective here, I want quantitative and 
predictable software performance, delivery against budget” (Program Management Head of Function).   
 
“Reports are frozen with history, containing planned and actuals…The asterisk means added to the sprint 
after the start, if it goes in, its urgent, it can come out if it’s not needed, something else changes, or there’s no 
time… Velocity doesn’t work for us, it assumes we have a constant team, and the team doesn’t work on the 
sprint work 100% of the time” (Scrum Master – Product 1) 
 
Consideration of this sample of narrative data shows that individuals may desire predictable software 
development performance, and may recognize competing interests that are managed tactically on a day-to-day basis. 
Scrum Master – Product 1 tries to tell a story, in recognizing that a narrative reveals the dynamics that are in effect 
in managing the software development process, but the stakeholders who would benefit from understanding the 
narrative (Program Management Head of Function and Program Manager – Product 2) are not open to non-
quantitative narrative forms. Their dominant paradigm cannot appreciate the complexity and dynamics that the 
scrum master is attempting to manage.  
 
Through semi-structured interviews and email follow-up, Scrum Master – Product 1 was able to provided 
evidence that underpinned his view.  The data quantifies the effects of some aspects of ‘reality’ that do not conform 
to the scrum methodology approach, specifically, in practice the sprint team is not consistent, their time is not 100% 
dedicated to the sprint (Table 5), and the backlog does not remain stable during the sprint (Table 6).  This is a result 
of the short-term demands on staff that are affected through the organizational structure, which at a minimum asks 
staff to satisfy demands from both the project and functional directions. Table 5 and Table 6 provide data that report 
the magnitude of the key drivers that Scrum Master – Product 1, believes most strongly influences the ability of the 
sprint-team to deliver the backlog as planned each sprint. Table 5 shows the equivalent staff utilization of a Product-
1 sprint team over 5 chronological sprints. The sprint team grows from 8 to 12 people, and utilization across an 
entire sprint varies from 100% to 29%. 
 
Table 6 shows the magnitude of unplanned staff absences, work removed from the sprint during the sprint, and 
work added to the sprint during the sprint.  Abortive work is work completed in the sprint on tasks that were not 
finished and were removed from the sprint mid-sprint. The magnitude of work delivered, compared to the magnitude 
that was planned across these seven sprints varies from around 80% of planned to 110% of planned. Average sprint 
churn (new tasks as a percentage of originally planned tasks) is 21%.  
Table 5 and Table 6 provide quantitative data that apparently disproves the validity of the dominant traditional 
approach to managing.  Though Scrum Master – Product 1 could clearly articulate the dynamics that led to emergent 
performance of the sprint team, they struggled to pass this understanding on to other managers. 
5.1.3 The Business Line Level 
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The Thales Organizational Management System states that monthly Program Review Meetings will be held and 
they are a forum where issues affecting technical development relating to delivery are evidenced and discussed, 
supported by an up-to-date Program Review Pack. This mechanism provides a forum to present and discuss the data 
in Table 5 and Table 6, and its origins and implications with engineering and project management functional leaders 
in the Business Line. It is mandatory for the Program Management Head of Function and the Operations Director 
(who at the time was also the Systems Engineering Head of Function) to attend the meetings. The meetings are a 
forum through which Business Line management monitor the active portfolio of programs, and provide strategic 
direction, support, and feedback to the project teams. The following quotes were provided by interviewees 
chronologically. 
 
“We look at the Program Review Pack and we don’t get good information on the state of the project….PMs 
are reluctant to step out of the standards scripts of headings for headlines” (Program Management Head of 
Function). 
 
“The program review packs still don’t get looked at, they don’t look at my supplementary pack [which 
reports sprint performance, lessons learned, engineering metrics, context, achievements, and upcoming 
milestones] “  (Scrum Master – Product 1) 
 
“I think from a business perspective we need, what we needed was some relatively simple metrics that could 
be collected easily” (Key Stakeholder - Acting Business Line Operations Director, and Head of Systems 
Engineering Function) 
 
The Acting Business Line Operations Director, who was also Head of the Systems Engineering Function (and 
the Key Stakeholder in this research) believed, at that point in time, that evidence relating to the ability of project 
engineering teams to meet delivery expectations was not available as part of the Program Review Pack, and 
therefore could not inform the discussions at the review meetings. In using the specific case of Product 1 to 
challenge this view, the Key Stakeholder stated that they had not actually attended recent meetings. 
 
The attendance of the Key Stakeholder in the program review meetings is stated as mandatory in the business 
management collateral as the Business Line Operations Director, but not as the Business Line Systems Engineering 
Head of Function.  Program Review Meetings for the Business Line are held over two days each month. During the 
6-months placement when this fieldwork was being performed, the Key Stakeholder attended all Program Reviews 
during two months, none of the program reviews during two months, and one-of-two days of program reviews 
during the other two months. During the last month of the fieldwork, a separate permanent Operations Director was 
appointed and in place. The permanent Operations Director did attend the program review meetings, as is stated as 
mandatory for that role. At the time, there was no other formal forum required by the Organizational Management 
System for the Systems Engineering Head of Function to engage with Project Engineers to understand progress and 
pressures. 
 
5.1.4 Traditional and Complex Adaptive Systems Perspectives 
The dynamics affecting the ability of the scrum to meet delivery expectations are not appreciated by a traditional 
view of the organization. The Scrum Master takes steps to inform management of discrepancies between planned 
and emergent achievements and their causes. The project and business line management show a preference to pursue 
performance that is predictable and they continue to deliver a prescriptive plan, even in the face of evidence that the 
context is too turbulent to achieve the desired performance levels using this approach. A CAS perspective 
understands this behavior as strong values being attributed to reductionist approaches (credit assignment), to the 
extent that rule discovery, and the generating of new capabilities (an appreciation of the complex dynamics in effect 
within the sprint team) does not occur as performance (moment to moment capabilities) is directed away from 
appreciating information that challenges the dominant paradigm.    
 
The Key Stakeholder, who was the Business Line Head of Systems Engineering, while also acting up in the 
Business Line Head of Operations role was not present at meetings their attendance is mandatory in.  A traditional 
management perspective offers no explanation as to how staff will or should prioritize their efforts when they are 
overburdened with work.  A CAS perspective expects agents to prioritize moment-to-moment according to their 
own personal, locally rational, view of what activity will be most beneficial. The CAS view can therefore explain 
why a staff member performing two roles simultaneously may not attend a mandatory meeting.  A CAS perspective 
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accommodates the evidence that the stakeholders involved have different and persistent perspectives. CAS dynamics 
are evident in this data, and they affect the ability to meet delivery expectations, however, the management 
personnel show no evidence of attempting to understand or manage the CAS dynamics. 
 
5.2 Topic 2 - Staff Circulation 
 
A theme of staff circulation affecting ability to complete work as planned arose through the stakeholder 
engagements.   
 
5.2.1 The Traditional Perspective 
The corporate intranet and business line management collateral that was provided by stakeholders, or accessible 
on the local network drive, describes the 1-year business plan for the business line, and shows how that supports 
longer term strategies and higher level business objectives for the business line and the parent Thales domain which 
are articulated in other business planning documents. 
 
The business plan for the Business Line identifies financial turnover and profit targets for the year, along with a 
detailed implementation plan, which includes a staff rotation target. The relevant sub-heading plans to develop a 
high performance team culture within the business line by ‘optimizing and enhancing capability through personal 
development and 10% staff rotation’.  The plan states that feedback would be gathered from managers and staff, 
quarter-by-quarter, to continuously improve the approach. In practice, however, the feedback was not gathered.  
These documents and statements reflect a traditional perspective in business planning as cause and effect are 
identified, along with an implementation plan that will ensure that the objectives are delivered.  
 
A sample from the Case Study database relating to staff circulation is provided by the following quotes: 
 
“We are rotating staff left right and center so we have program mobility….The last 2 sprints have had to pay 
significantly for new people. You don’t get it and you won’t get it for several months, this is the rotation 
plan….” (Scrum Master - Product 2) 
 
“There is an administrative overload related to juggling tasks so people who have fewer skills are occupied” 
(Scrum Master – Product 1) 
 
“We’ve had people coming in and out of the project, agile should keep the team together..” (Systems 
Engineering – Product 3) 
 
“We shuffle resources around, attempting to achieve an increase in knowledge capability and more interest, 
but we don’t know the impacts…The rotation aim is 10% per year…There is much greater than 10% 
circulation going on” (Program Manager – Product 2) 
 
The individual stakeholders describe either the effects of staff rotation, or the aims of staff rotation, but no one 
person had a view that covered both. Staff rotation was described as impacting the ability to efficiently and 
effectively develop software, which in turn impacts the ability of Systems Engineers to manage the overall 
development lifecycle.  Systems engineers described staff rotations, but did not note an impact to the ability to 
perform Systems Engineering work. Of the 12 staff who directly contributed to the bounded case study database 
examined here, 4 changed permanent roles during the 6 month period of embedded research, with a further 4 
changing roles in the 6 month period that followed, giving an annual staff churn of 66% in this sample.  
 
 
5.2.2 The Complex Adaptive System Perspective 
The systems researcher then contextualized locally gathered data within the system dynamics model described in 
Van Oorschot, et al (2010, p831) relating to assimilation delays and reallocation delays, and presented it to the Key 
Stakeholder. The perspective provided by this aspect of the system dynamics model shows how overall productivity 
is decreased if staff rotations occur faster than novices can progress to expert levels when assigned to new types of 
work.  This approach stretched the Key Stakeholder to consider nonlinear dynamics within the organization, as a 
departure from a more traditional mechanistic view. 
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“Ah, it might be that we’ve had a worse impact than we thought, that’s enlightening, we want to cope with 
the perturbation…maybe we are a more competent engineering organization than we thought” (Key 
Stakeholder, Acting Operations Director and Head of Systems Engineering Function) 	  
The engagement with the Key Stakeholder had revealed to them a tension between competing ideals – 
circulating staff to increase overall capability while also retaining experienced staff to deliver development work 
efficiently. The systems researcher used this approach to engage with the key stakeholder as it responded to the 
initial need for the placement in the Business Line, and it also provided a mechanism to expose the key stakeholder, 
when viewed as an agent in a CAS, to novel information and constructs.  This allowed the possibility to observe the 
response of the Key Stakeholder over time. 
 
During the 6 weeks that followed this discussion, this same grounded approach was used again to help the Key 
Stakeholder understand dynamics and emergent properties of other variables within the Business Line engineering 
function. This allowed potentially beneficial interventions that were available to the Key Stakeholder to be 
identified. 
 
“I like that....you know what, I’d be quite keen to try and do something like this on something like 
Product_4” (Key Stakeholder, Acting Operations Director and Head of Systems Engineering Function) 
 
Viewing this response using a Complex Adaptive System perspective, the Key Stakeholder (agent) had 
discovered the value of an alternative method of understanding what affects the performance of the engineering 
function (rule discovery). Considering the options available to them, they considered an approach based on complex 
dynamics to be of higher value than the traditional reductionist planning and control techniques (credit-assignment), 
to the point where the way in which the Key Stakeholder planned to allocate their effort would now change 
(performance). 
 
While the Key Stakeholder did not actively seek alternative perspectives on how the performance of the Business 
Line engineering function could be understood, an adaptation in response to the systems researcher’s actions 
(presentation of dynamic relationships, rather than the quantitative performance data that was expected) led to an 
alternative perspective being considered, found valuable, and acted upon.  
 
5.3 Topic 3 - Management Databases 
 
Operations within the business line are expected to be carried out in line with the process-based Organizational 
Management System. Various management systems and tools are used to support this; of relevance to managing 
Systems Engineering development projects are Business Planning, Primavera, and Jira. Each of these tools includes 
their own database.  This analysis explores the espoused contents and ostensible uses of the databases, and the 
beliefs held by the staff about their purpose, content, and use from a reductionist and CAS perspective. Table 7 
outlines the three tool databases and gives a headline view of what the databases contain. 
 
The following quotes illustrate the beliefs held by the staff about the tools. 
 
“When you look in Jira, make sure what you are looking at is what you are thinking you are looking at” 
(Scrum Master – Product 1) 
 
“In actuals, is overtime visible or not? – it’s not visible on actuals…we are mixing apples and pears, we are 
mixing the contents…” (Systems Engineer – Product 3) 
 
“The cost collection is actually at different levels, for example, from subcontractors and from Jira. The 
lowest level we go should be the level you get actuals against. Primavera breakdown was mapped against 
delivery structure routed through work packages by customer, but we estimate and collect cost through 
product and function.” (Project Controller – Multiple Projects) 
 
“A Thales UK Corporate Business Planning Lead  was hard on prescriptive direction, now it’s ‘you tune 
the process for what works for you’, we’ve gone full circle back with everyone being in the room at the 
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same time….You’ve got to have human beings in the loop” (Key Stakeholder, Acting Operations Director, 
and Head of Systems Engineering Function) 
 
“We want to integrate Jira to Primavera for work package management and earned value management. I 
already look at software burndown daily” (Head of Software Engineering Function) 
 
“We’ve been trying to sort out how we do agile…last year we had a workshop on linking Primavera to 
Jira…Primavera tells you how many people you need in the sprint to do it. The actuals should be in Jira and 
Primavera…we export from Jira back to Primavera as target EVM” (Program Management Head of 
Function)  
 
The staff, as a collective, consider the data held within the suite of databases to be of varying quality. There are 
conflicting reports of how the data is used, for example, whether the Primavera schedule defines the size of the 
sprint team, or whether the sprint team is fixed and does the work that it can.  
 
Scrum Master – Product 1 and Systems Engineer – Product 3 identify that data in the databases are not actually 
what they might appear to be. The Software and Program Management Functional Managers use the data in the 
databases to make decisions. This is characteristic of a reductionist perspective, where the data in the database is 
considered to be objectively representative of ‘the world’, such that decisions can be made without need for case-
specific data validation.   
 
The Software and Program Management Functional Managers describe a desire to link the databases, or belief 
that it actually already occurs. The Project Controller notes that Primavera and Jira are not structurally similar 
enough to be linked currently (a claim that was validated by independently acquired data).  
 
The Key Stakeholder notes that “you’ve got to have human beings in the loop” for work they personally participate 
in, but when considering the work being carried out on projects, appears to initially assume reductionist, impersonal 
approaches are adequate “what we needed was some relatively simple metrics that could be collected easily” (Key 
Stakeholder). 
 
5.3.1 The Traditional Perspective 
A traditional reductionist view of organizational management assumes that quantitative data represents an 
objective reality, and that the data would be understood comparably by all staff that could view it. The diversity of 
belief about the content, meaning, and use of the same datasets across this group of stakeholders cannot be explained 
by traditional reductionist perspectives.  Traditional perspectives and methods can neither explain this situation, nor 
offer a way forward for the business.  
 
5.3.1 The Complex Adaptive System Perspective 
A CAS perspective, where agents understand their surroundings affected by their personally accumulated 
experience, is able to accommodate the evidence presented here. Similarly, it is able to explain the accommodation 
and adjustments staff make in using these tools.  Managing an organization as a CAS may offer ways forward for 
this particular industrial problem.  
 
6. DISCUSSION 
 
At the Business Line level of analysis, the expectation regarding future business outcomes and how they would 
be realized was articulated through the business planning documentation.  The paradigm that the expectations are 
derived from is traditional, which is unable to acknowledge that a link between cause and effect may only be 
knowable in hindsight, and it is unable to explain emergence, or manifestation of the ‘unexpected’. In practice, the 
methods identified in the business plans that were expected to deliver the desired outcomes were not used, planned 
monitoring was not carried out. 
 
The Business Line delivery performance displays emergent properties arising from the complexity of the 
technical systems under development and the actions of staff within the Business Line.  A narrative that describes 
how and why emergent outcomes arose was provided by some of the staff members, if they had an immediate view 
of the key dynamics.  Recognition of the CAS property that agents are not all-knowing, rather they exhibit a 
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bounded view and operate rationally within that sphere explains why those able to perceive and describe process 
narratives can do so only for the area of the organization they operate within. 
 
The empirical research found evidence of interconnectedness, dynamics, autonomous agent behavior and 
bounded rationality, consistent with a CAS perspective that leads to the emergent performance of the engineering 
function as it works to develop Systems Engineering solutions.  The emergent performance may be unexpected and 
dissatisfactory, since expectations are often developed from within a reductionist paradigm. The same emergent 
performance could be considered entirely plausible and reasonably expected if expectations were developed from a 
complex adaptive systems perspective.  
 
The range of management approaches endorsed by functional and project managers also originate in a 
reductionist paradigm. The use of these approaches are theoretically, and as shown here in practice, ineffective in 
supporting pursuit of desirable outcomes from an organization that exhibits CAS properties.  
     
The evidence began in topic 1 considering the effect that unplanned changes in staff, and work tasks had on the 
ability of the sprint team to deliver a completed backlog as planned. The unplanned changes emerged due to the 
complexity of the organization; staff are humans and are occasionally absent from work, and the short-term needs of 
other projects and functions in a matrix organization are deemed to take priority over the stability of the planned 
sprint.  The theme of staff instability expanded in topic two to capture a dynamic of staff frequently changing their 
‘permanent’ roles.  In both topics 1 and 2, reductionist plans and approaches aiming to deliver projects and business 
plan objectives were unable to accommodate or account for the complex dynamics that were evident in the 
workplace.  The aims that the traditionally-derived project and business plans sought to achieve were therefore 
jeopardized.  
 
The third topic shows evidence of traditional views in the Business Line management. Though there is some 
acknowledgement that data held within the various management databases may be questionable, the managers still 
view the data through the databases in preference to using other methods to understand the ‘remote’ situation that 
the data nominally represents. In the case of the Key Stakeholder, in examples directly related to their work, there 
was some evidence of an appreciation of the role that complexity plays (in response to evidence provided in topic 2, 
and from their own experience of business planning in topic 3). 
 
The Complex Adaptive System perspective used here considers agents having three levels of activity; 
performance, credit-assignment, and rule-discovery (Holland, 2014).  For an agent within the system (for example a 
functional manager) to use complexity-based approaches to help manage development work towards satisfactory 
delivery (performance), they need to see the value and relevance of a complexity-based approached (credit-
assignment), which can only be developed if familiarity with the concepts is gained (rule-discovery). Familiarity 
with the concepts can only be gained if the agent chooses to allocate their performance towards learning or 
exploring the possibilities that a complexity-based approach may offer them in pursing the goals of their role. If a 
traditional paradigm is firmly engrained and strongly preferred (habitus), there would be no appetite for this learning 
or exploring.  The ‘purely-traditionally-thinking’ CAS agent self-reinforces an inability to manage complexity. 
 
A traditional view would assume some form of ‘closed loop’ management occurs, such as a plan-do-check-act 
cycle.  This approach would, in theory, identify and analyze the pervasive inability of the organization to deliver as 
planned. In the example organization explored here, the relevant stakeholders did not engage in this aspect of 
organizational management.  Anecdotally, the demands on staff time greatly exceed their abilities to complete their 
full workload, so they, as individuals, prioritize what work is actually done moment-to-moment, day-to-day. 
Evidence in the case study database demonstrates this point, but is not reproduced here.  This dynamic is entirely 
understandable through a CAS lens, but not through a traditional view. This dynamic harms the self-checking 
mechanism inherent in traditional approaches, so not only is the emergent performance of the organization not ‘as 
expected’, but the in-built mechanisms that would be expected to raise an alarm are also disabled. 
 
The findings from this work demonstrate that CAS dynamics can be observed within a Systems Engineering 
development organization, and they affect the ability to meet delivery expectations. The dominant approaches to 
planning and management, however, are more traditionally reductionist and deterministic in nature, and are 
therefore unable to understand and accommodate these dynamics in support of effective project development and 
desirable delivery performance.  The evidence presented here show all project engineering staff sampled identify 
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aspects of complexity in their work. Project and product engineering staff, to varying degrees instinctively employ 
methods and manage expectations that complement the dynamics and inherent uncertainty faced in their work. 
 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
 
The research aimed to explore the question ‘how does how does complexity in the organization affect the ability 
of Systems Engineers to meet delivery expectations in terms of cost and time?’ The research examines three topics. 
Each topic demonstrates that delivery expectations are derived from perspectives that assume deterministic relations 
between cause and effect, which manifest through assumptions that desired outcomes can be delivered reliably and 
predictably through control-loop-style management activities. Each topic also demonstrated that the characteristics 
of specific aspects of the organization considered are complex, in the sense that cause and effect can only be 
understood in retrospect, so specific outcomes cannot be reliably predicted. Efforts to manage a complex adaptive 
system in order to enable desirable emergence could not guarantee that desired outcomes were achieved on every 
occasion. 
 
The failure to meet delivery expectations in Systems Engineering development projects has been addressed in 
the Systems Engineering literature largely through quantitative approaches that have sought correlation between 
context and outcome. The research presented in this paper is concerned with causality rather than correlation. It 
finds that often cause and effect can only be understood in hindsight due to the complex adaptive nature of the 
organization, which allows us to conclude that Systems Engineering development projects carried out by complex 
adaptive organizations cannot be planned and controlled to guarantee that target delivery dates and costs will be 
achieved uniformly.  
 
This leads us to conclude that a suitable organizational management approach to apply to a portfolio of systems 
engineering development projects is one that enables desirable emergence from within the complex adaptive system. 
Literature could not be found that examines this in practice. This management approach is a form of engagement 
with a wicked problem (Rittel and Webber, 1973). The reductionist view is, however, adequate for planning and 
managing delivery in the stable areas within the organization (Sayer, 2000:14-15), so a management approach that 
enables desirable emergence is suggested here as a suitable accompaniment to traditional management methods, 
rather than as a substitution. With the use of management approaches that support desirable emergence, comes a 
need to recognize that the success of delivery performance across a portfolio can not be judged solely through 
statistical analysis of deviations from precise, quantitative target points, such as number of days late, or the 
magnitude of cost over runs. 
 
A compelling direction for further research would explore how reductionist management and CAS management 
approaches can complement each other in supporting Systems Engineering development organizations as they strive 
to meet delivery expectations. This would also support the view of Van De Ven and Poole (2005) that multiple 
perspectives are complementary and necessary. The industrial need is two-fold; firstly, to understand how the 
management approaches are relevant and can complement one another and secondly, to identify methods to supply 
this information and these tools to practitioners, so they - the agents comprising the system - can be more informed 
about how the system works, and how to enable the outcomes they desire in terms of delivery performance. Indeed, 
a systems engineering view of the people, tools and processes of a systems engineering development organization 
could be considered to shed light on how the two management approaches can applied to achieve desired 
performance from the organization.  Complexity Leadership Theory (Uhl-Bien and Marion, 2009) also offers an 
explanation of how reductionist and CAS management approaches can complement each other. The theory is 
operationalized in two case studies described in Gilbert, et al. (2015). 
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Table 1 Product 1 Sprint Performance  
Sprint 
Number 
Sprint Team 1 Sprint Team 2 Sprint Team 3 Sprint Team 4 
Committed 
(Planned) 
Completed 
(Actual) 
Committed 
(Planned) 
Completed 
(Actual) 
Committed 
(Planned) 
Completed 
(Actual) 
Committed 
(Planned) 
Completed 
(Actual) 
N 11 1 53 32.5 10 10 0 0 
N+1 10 3 32.5 18 0 0 0 0 
N+2 10 3 45.5 23.25 15 2 9 0 
N+3 13 8 45.5 19.5 24.5 5.5 19 0 
N+4 5 5.5 64.5 42.25 46.5 32.5 46.5 32.5 
N+5 8 6 60 22.5 22.25 4 27.25 4 
N+6 0 0 56.75 23 16.5 12 22 17 
Total 57 26.5 357.75 181 134.75 66 123.75 53.5 
Sprint 
Number 
Sprint Team 5 Sprint Team 6 Total 
Committed 
(Planned) 
Completed 
(Actual) 
Committed 
(Planned) 
Completed 
(Actual) 
Committed 
(Planned) 
Completed 
(Actual) 
N 29.5 16 15.5 12.5 119 72 
N+1 17.5 7 15 15 75 43 
N+2 13 5 12.5 13.25 105 46.5 
N+3 8 0 5 4 115 37 
N+4 8 0 10 4.25 180.5 117 
N+5 8.25 1 23.5 11.5 149.25 49 
N+6 16.75 6.5 23.5 4.5 135.5 63 
Total 101 35.5 105 65 879.25 427.5 
Page 17 of 22 
 
Table 2 Product 2 Sprint Performance 
Sprint 
Number 
Sprint Team 7 Sprint Team 8 Sprint Team 9 Total 
Committed 
(Planned) 
Completed 
(Actual) 
Committed 
(Planned) 
Completed 
(Actual) 
Committed 
(Planned) 
Completed 
(Actual) 
Committed 
(Planned) 
Completed 
(Actual) 
N 125 0 115 0 0 0 240 0 
N+1 318 291.5 22 0 0 0 340 291.5 
N+2 1180 800 90 0 12 0 1282 800 
N+3 1258.5 960 794.5 539 305 262 2358 1761 
N+4 617.5 635.5 496.5 434.5 121 77 1235 1147 
N+5 524 312 181 140 341 170 1046 622 
N+6 35 198.5 35 194 0 4 70 396.5 
Total 4058 3197.5 1734 1307.5 779 513 6571 5018 
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Table 3 Product 3 Sprint Performance 
Sprint 
Number 
Sprint Team 10 Sprint Team 11 Sprint Team 12 
Committed 
(Planned) 
Completed 
(Actual) 
Committed 
(Planned) 
Completed 
(Actual) 
Committed 
(Planned) 
Completed 
(Actual) 
N 497.5 224.4 1363.3 1066.65 674.4 731.25 
N+1 527 239.5 1493 1005.4 617.9 497.8 
N+2 384.5 300.7 785.3 467.5 268 137.2 
N+3 310.9 172.9 645.35 351.65 211.8 136.2 
N+4 274 68.9 695.1 414.8 247.6 213.6 
N+5 375.3 262.9 1029.42 498.92 375.52 163.52 
N+6 322.6 230.3 1286.55 764.8 508.2 318.1 
Total 2691.8 1499.6 7298.02 4569.72 2903.42 2197.67 
Sprint 
Number 
Sprint Team 13 Total 
Committed 
(Planned) 
Completed 
(Actual) 
Committed 
(Planned) 
Completed 
(Actual) 
N 96.2 111 2133.9 1908.9 
N+1 252.9 268.1 2363.8 1771.3 
N+2 29.6 29.6 1082.9 634.3 
N+3 68.45 42.55 925.6 530.4 
N+4 76.3 76.3 1019 704.7 
N+5 198.1 55.5 1603.04 717.94 
N+6 316.7 216.4 2111.45 1299.3 
Total 12893.24 8266.99 23094.68 15034.38 
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Table 4 Sprint Summary Statistics 
Product 1 (see Table 1) R-Squared m 
Unformatted Data Points 0.771 0.509 
Italicised Data Points 0.971 0.496 
Bold Data Points 0.444 0.502 
Product 2 (see Table 2) 
 
R-Squared m 
Unformatted Data Points 0.916 0.740 
Italicised Data Points 0.997 0.779 
Bold Data Points 0.880 0.737 
Product 3 (see Table 3) 
 
R-Squared m 
Unformatted Data Points 0.884 0.656 
Italicised Data Points 0.976 0.637 
Bold Data Points 0.860 0.667 
All Products R-Squared m 
Unformatted Data Points 0.928 0.681 
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Table 5 Sprint Team Member Availability by Sprint 
Product 1 
  
Equivalent Staff Utilisation During the Sprint 
Sprint M Sprint M+1 Sprint M+2 Sprint M+3 Sprint M+4 Average 
Staff Member A 68% 72% 56% 61% 46% 60% 
Staff Member B 84% 67% 77% 81% 60% 74% 
Staff Member C 89% 100% 95% 100% 67% 90% 
Staff Member D 63% 95% 72% 72% 65% 73% 
Staff Member E 63% 86% 77% 68% 69% 72% 
Staff Member F 84% 90% 81% 86% 69% 82% 
Staff Member G 89% 100% 80% 85% 70% 85% 
Staff Member H   81% 88% 60% 46% 
Staff Member I 84% 95% 61% 83% 57% 76% 
Staff Member J 
   
38% 29% 33% 
Staff Member K 
    
51% 51% 
Staff Member L 
    
60% 60% 
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Table 6 Sprint Churn by Sprint 
Sprint 
Number 
Originally 
Planned 
Work 
Unplanned Staff 
Availability 
Change 
Planned 
Work 
Removed 
Unplanned 
Work 
Added 
Abortive 
Work 
Sprint 
Churn 
Actual 
Work 
Delivered 
Magnitude Magnitude Percent Magnitude Magnitude Magnitude Percent Magnitude 
Sprint I 783 -35 -4% 12 105 0 13% 806 
Sprint I+1 668 -63 -9% 267 47 -24 7% 642 
Sprint I+2 465 -5 -1% 126 84 -19 18% 393 
Sprint I+3 1015 -38 -4% 302 257 -58 25% 865 
Sprint I+4 996 6 1% 242 283 0 28% 1088 
Sprint I+5 1055 -29 -3% 292 361 -130 34% 1198 
Sprint I+6 1458 -77 -5% 775 280 -161 19% 1157 
Average   -4%    21%  
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Table 7 Management Tools and Databases 
Tool Contents (Units) and Scope 
Jira® 
 
Work (Tasks and Problems), Future, Present and History 
Primavera® 
 
Work (Work packages) People (named and unnamed) Future and 
up-to-last-report 
Business Planning Backlog (£ Budget) People (Headcount) Future 
 
 
